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Single-Sex Schools and Classroom:
Is "Separate but Comparable" Legally Permissible?
Donald F. Uerling
Gretchen Hall

Abstract
Most public schools in the United States have been coeducational, based at least in part on a
general belief that single-sex schools and classrooms were legally impermissible. Now the issue
of single-sex education has been raised again by the No Child Left Behind Act of2001, which
provides that federal funds may be made available to local education agencies for an array of
innovative assistance programs, including programs to provide same-gender schools and
classrooms. An analysis of applicable law, coupled with a review of the merits of single-sex
schooling, suggests that "separate but comparable" single-sex public school education might be
legally permissible.

Introduction
During the past several decades, most public elementary and secondary schools in the United
States have been coeducational, based at least in part on a general belief that single-sex schools
and classrooms were legally impermissible. Sadker and Sadker (1994) expressed a common
point of view: "Today, single-sex schools are an endangered species; they are illegal in the
public sector and vanishing rapidly from the private sector" (p. 232). The American Association
of University Women (1998) raised a telling question: Should educators and researchers continue
to invest their efforts in a strategy-single-sex education-that is of questionable legality?
Now the issue of single-sex education has been raised again by the No Child Left Behind Act
of 200 1, which provides that federal funds may be made available to local education agencies for
an array of innovative assistance programs, among which are included programs to provide
same-gender schools and classrooms.
An analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional law reveals some commonly-held
beliefs about single-sex schooling, and explores the circumstances under which "separate but
comparable" single-sex education in public elementary and secondary schools might be legally
permissible.

Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
assistance" (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 2001). The federal regulations implementing Title IX state that
no school receiving federal funds shall "provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its
education activity separately on the basis of sex" 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2002). Reading these two
provisions together could lead to a conclusion that no public school receiving federal funding is
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allowed to offer a single-sex education program, whether it be an entire school or a single class
within a coeducational (mixed gender) school. But contrary to popular belief, nothing in Title IX
explicitly prohibits single-sex schools. In regard to admissions, the prohibition against
discrimination based on sex exempts non-vocational elementary and secondary schools (see, 20
U.S.c. § 1681(a)(1), 2001).
The Code of Federal Regulations recites the rules promulgated by the u.s. Department of
Education to carry out the provisions of Title IX. A pertinent provision in these regulations states
that a local educational agency (LEA) may "exclude any person from admission" to a
non-vocational elementary or secondary school "on the basis of sex" only if "such recipient
otherwise makes available to such person, pursuant to the same policies and criteria of
admission, courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and facility
offered in or through such schools" (34 C.F.R. § 106.35(b), 2002). Thus, neither Title IX nor the
implementing regulations prohibit school districts receiving federal funding from operating
single-sex schools, but only if those districts provide schools with comparable programs for both
sexes.
Although single-sex schools may be permissible under Title IX, most single-sex classes
within coeducational public schools are not. The general prohibition of sex-based discrimination
in the statute (see, 20 U.S.C. § 1681,2001), is paralleled by language in the federal regulations,
(see, 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a), 2002). The regulations also include a more specific provision
pertaining to access to course offerings.
A recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program
or activity separately on the basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of
its students on such basis, including health, physical education, industrial, business,
vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education courses. (34
C.F.R. § 106.34,2002)
But this section also includes exceptions that may lead to single-sex classes. Among the more
important are those that permit grouping students in physical education classes and activities by
ability (Id. at § 106.34(b), 2002), separating students by sex in physical education classes or
sports where the purpose or major part involves bodily contact (Id. at 106.34(c), 2002),
conducting separate sessions for boys and girls in portions of classes that deal exclusively with
human sexuality (Id. § 106.34(e), 2002), and having requirements based on vocal range or
quality that may result in choruses predominantely of one sex (Id. § 106.34(f),2002).

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind
Act of2001, which reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. One
section in this massive piece oflegislation provides that federal innovative assistance funds made
available to local educational agencies may be used to support "[p ]rograms to provide
same-gender schools and classrooms (consistent with applicable law)" (Id. at § 5131(a)(23),
2001).
The Act also required the Secretary of Education to issue, within 120 days, guidelines for
local education agencies seeking funding for programs described in subsection (a)(23)
(Id. § 5131 (c), 2001). As directed, the Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education,

published guidelines on current Title IX requirements related to single-sex classes and schools
(67 Fed. Reg. 31102, May 8, 2002). These guidelines make clear that the Department believes
that Title IX and its regulations permit certain kinds of single-sex classes in coeducational
schools and, if certain conditions are met, single-sex schools within a school system. If a school
district establishes a single-sex school for one sex to offer a particular program, then the other
sex must also have access to a comparable school with that curriculum. And, the "comparable
school" must also be single-sex.
On that same date, the Department of Education published in the Federal Register a "notice
of intent to regulate," (67 Fed. Reg. 31098, 2002), which gave notice that the Secretary of
Education intends to propose amendments to the regulations implementing Title IX that would
provide more flexibility for educators to establish single-sex classes and schools at the
elementary and secondary level.
The purpose of the amendments would be to support efforts of school districts to improve
educational outcomes for children and to provide public school parents with a diverse array
of educational options that respond to the educational needs of their children, while at the
same time ensuring appropriate safeguards against discrimination. (ld. at 31098, 2002)
The notice invited comments on whether, and under what circumstances, single-sex schools and
classrooms should be permitted. As this article was being prepared, the Department was
reviewing the many comments received.
The notice of intent to regulate stated that the proposed regulations would have to be
consistent with both Title IX and the Constitution. The Department noted that the Supreme Court
had decided two constitutional cases that specifically addressed single-sex education, United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982). These cases are discussed below.

Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that no States shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection ofthe laws." The Equal Protection Clause comes into play when some form of
legislative classification is at issue. To analyze the constitutionality of such classifications, the
Supreme Court has devised a three-tiered analysis, which it summarized in Plyler v. Doe (1982).
A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications, and in applying the
Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, the Court seeks only the assurance that the
classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose (Id. at 216). This
is the "rational basis" test, which imposes little difficulty on a government entity.
The Court treats as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect
class" or that impinge on the exercise of a "fundamental right" for such classifications, the state
must demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest (ld. at 216-17). This is the "strict scrutiny" test, which is extremely
difficult for a government entity to satisfy.
In addition, certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious,
nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances the
Court inquires whether the classification may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest
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of the state (ld. at 217-18). This is the intermediate-level "heightened scrutiny" test, which
imposes a significant, but not impossible, burden of justification on a government entity.
For many years, classifications based on sex have been subject to scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, and state government entities that use such classifications have been required
to satisfy the intermediate-level "heightened scrutiny" test (see e.g., Craig v. Boren, 1976;
Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973). Thus, proponents of single-sex schools and classes in public
school systems should be prepared to demonstrate an educationally sound justification for such
an arrangement.

Single-Sex Education in the Courts
Higher Education
The United States Supreme Court has rendered two decisions dealing with single-sex
education at the college level: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), and
United States v. Virginia (1996). These two cases offer some insight into the principles that
probably would guide an equal protection analysis of gender-based classifications in K -12
schools.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), a male student was excluded, solely
on the basis of gender, from enrolling in the School of Nursing at the Mississippi University for
Women. He sued the University, alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that those seeking to uphold a statute
classifying individuals on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for the classification, a burden that can be met only by showing at least
that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives (Hogan at 724).
The University's arguments for excluding men from the School of Nursing failed to satisfy
either part of this Equal Protection test. First, the state made no showing that women lacked
either training or leadership opportunities that needed to be remedied by excluding men; rather
than compensating for any discriminatory barriers faced by women, the policy of excluding
males tended to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as exclusively a woman's job.
Second, the argument that women are adversely affected by the presence of men in the College
of Nursing was undermined by the policy of permitting men to audit nursing classes. The Court
held that excluding males from enrolling in the state-supported School of Nursing violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
In United States v. Virginia (1996), the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a prestigious allmale military college, came under fire for its policy of refusing admission to women. While at
VMI, male students were engaged in military-type "adversative" training, which was meant to
encourage them to be leaders in military and civilian life. Strong emphasis was placed on the
cadet-style training, which included rigorous tests of physical and moral aptitude. The school's
mISSIon was
to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued
with love oflearning, confident in the functions and attitudes ofleadership, possessing a high

sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system,
and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of national peril (Id. at 522).
Prompted by a complaint filed with the Attorney General by a female high school student
seeking admission to VMI, the United States filed suit against the institution and the
Commonwealth of Virginia, alleging that the male-only admissions requirement violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially ruled in favor
ofVMI, noting that the government had met its burden of showing the government action based
on sex met the "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification (Id. at 524). Studying
the benefits of single-gender educational environments, the court reasoned that if having a maleonly educational environment was central to the mission of the school, then the "only means of
achieving the objective is to exclude women from the all-male institution-VMI" (Id.). The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, and vacated the lower court's
judgment. This court emphasized a nondiscrimination commitment undertaken by the
Commonwealth of Virginia in a 1990 Report that stated, "It is extremely important that colleges
and universities deal with faculty, staff, and students without regard to sex, race, or ethnic
origin." (Id. at 525). The Court of Appeals suggested three options for Virginia to consider as
remedial actions: (a) admit women to VMI, (b) establish parallel institutions or programs, or (c)
abandon state support, leaving VMI to function as a private institution existing on non-pUblic
funds.
Virginia chose the second option suggested by the Court of Appeals and established a
parallel program at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts school for women. This parallel
program, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), shared much ofVMI's mission to
produce 'citizen-soldiers'; however, in many respects VWIL was much different from its male
counterpart. Compared to VMI, VWIL was much smaller, enrolling around 25-30 students,
maintained a less-prestigious faculty holding fewer Ph.D's than that ofVMI's faculty, and
offered fewer academic majors. Interestingly enough, a task force of Mary Baldwin faculty
charged with designing the VWIL program decided that VMI's military model of education
would be "wholly inappropriate" for VWIL. The stringent adversative experience that bonded
men on the VMI campus would not be part of the VWIL's program; instead, the focus of
instruction and training would favor a "cooperative method which reinforces self-esteem" (Id. at
527). Women at VWIL would participate in a less-stringent ROTC program, which the school
admitted was "largely ceremonial," and would learn many of the same skills taught through
high-stress situations at VMI through guest speakers and service projects (Id.). There were also
large differences in funding; VMI enjoyed an endowment of roughly $131 million, compared to
Mary Baldwin's endowment of only $19 million. Additionally, the court recognized the wide
array of alumni contacts available to VMI graduates that helped with employment prospects and
networking opportunities, both of which were unavailable to graduates ofVWIL's program (Id.
at 748).
Virginia returned to the district court seeking approval of its proposed remedial plan. The
district court decided that the plan satisfied the Equal Protection Clause, anticipating that the two
schools would achieve substantially similar outcomes; a divided court of appeals affirmed,
applying a "substantive comparability" test. The United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
and the Supreme Court granted the writ, thus choosing to review the court of appeals decision.
In United States v. Virginia (1996) the Court confronted two basic issues: First, did Virginia's
exclusion of women from the unique opportunities offered by VMI deny them equal protection
Journal o/Women in Educational Leadership, Vol. 1, No. 2-Apri12003
ISSN: 1541-6224 © 2003 Pro>Active Publications

21

22
of the law? Second, if exclusion from VMI offended the Constitution, what would be the
remedial requirement?
The Court followed the analysis it had set out in Hogan for cases where there is a state
government classification based on gender: focusing on the differential treatment or denial of
opportunity, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is
"exceedingly persuasive;" the burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the
state. The state must show at least that the classification serves important governmental interests
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. The Court noted that "[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females" (Virginia at 532-33).
The Court noted, however, that the heightened review standard
... does not make sex a proscribed classification. Supposed "inherent differences" are no
longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classification. [citation deleted]
Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring: [T]he two sexes are
not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community
composed of both." [citation deleted] (Id. at 533).
Classifications based on sex may be used to remediate past wrongs against women, but may
no longer be used "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women"
(Id. at 534).
The Supreme Court found that Virginia had shown no "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for excluding women from admission to VMI and that the remedy proffered by Virginia-the
Mary Baldwin VWIL program-did not cure the constitutional violation.
In addressing the first issue, the Court undertook a study of single-sex education and found
that it does benefit some students. However, using the rationale presented in Hogan, the Court
found no link between the goal of the institution and the actual purpose of the discrimination.
That is, there was no connection between preparing students to enter the world as productive
citizen-soldiers and the need to exclude women from that educational process. The opinion
offered an historical summary of women's education in the United States, noting that tradition at
many colleges had been to discriminate against women. Some of the same arguments offered by
Virginia had been offered in decades past, including the idea that women would disrupt the
campus environment, standards would have to be lowered, and the reputation of the school
would be tarnished. As early as 1970, however, a federal district court confirmed the necessity of
admitting women to the University of Virginia. Taking the history of Virginia together with the
state's policy emphasizing diversity, the Court found no connection between the all-male
admission policy ofVMI and the desire of the state to promote diversity. The Court also noted
that there were women who could meet the current admissions requirements at VMI, and thus in
some instances, the only reason some women were denied admission was simply because of their
gender, not because they could not meet the school's strenuous demands.
Having found that the exclusion of women from VMI violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court moved to determine what remedial action, ifany, could satisfy the demands of the
Constitution. The Court found major differences between the education offered to women at
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership and that offered to male cadets at Virginia Military
Institute. Most significant was that the state deliberately did not make VWIL a military-style

institution, which meant that the women at VWIL would not receive the same benefits of the
adversative training offered at VMI.
Virginia offered a rationale for the different approaches to education at the two institutions,
noting the methodology was "justified pedagogically based on important differences between
men and women in learning and developmental needs, and psychological and sociological
differences"(Id. at 549). Virginia relied on the educational judgment of the Mary Baldwin faculty
that the adversative training offered at VMI was "wholly inappropriate for educating and training
most women" (Id. at 549). The Court rejected this notion, stating that "generalizations about 'the
way women are' ... no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talents and capacity
place them outside the average description" (Id. at 550).
The Court found VWIL's program to be unequal to VMI's in a number of other respects.
First-year students at VWIL scored an average of 100 points less on the SAT than students at
VMI; the staff at VWIL held fewer Ph.D.s than their faculty counterparts at VMI; there were
fewer curricular choices for students at VWIL than at VMI; there were fewer physical training
facilities at VWIL than the expansive practice and training facilities at VMI; there was less
financial support for students at VWIL than for those at VMI; and graduates of VWIL do not
enjoy the prestige that goes with being a graduate ofVMI (Id. at 551-52). The Court concluded
by stating that "Virginia, in sum, while maintaining VMI for men only, has failed to provide any
"comparable single-gender women's institution ... Instead, the Commonwealth has created a
VWIL program fairly appraised as a "pale shadow" ofVMI in terms of the range of curricular
choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence" (Id. at 553).
The Court's analysis in United States v. Virginia implies that when girls are educated apart
from boys in state educational institutions "separate but comparable" might satisfy the
constitutional standard. It must be noted, however, that the notion of constitutional "separate but
comparable" in the context of segregation based on sex should not be confused with the
unconstitutional "separate but equal" in the context of segregation based on race. The Supreme
Court made it clear in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that maintaining separate schools on
the basis of race was inherently unconstitutional.
The Court addressed a straightforward issue in Brown (1954): "Does segregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities?" (Id. at 493). The Court answered with a powerful statement: "To separate them
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone" (Id. at 494).
The evils of segregation based on race may raise concerns about segregation based on sex;
however, separation based on sex does not impose the same stigma as does separation based on
race. From a constitutional perspective the two forms of classification are fundamentally
different. Simply put, there are no meaningful differences between the races, but there are
meaningful differences between the sexes. The distinction is reflected in the Equal Protection
Clause analysis, where classifications based on race are subjected to the very demanding strict
scrutiny test, while classifications based on sex are subject to the less-demanding heightened
scrutiny test.
The Court's broad discussion in United States v. Virginia (1996) supports the proposition that
"separate but comparable" in respect to separating students by sex would be constitutional if in
fact the schools and programs provided to both were truly comparable. The Court had the
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opportunity, as it did in Brown, to simply find that "separate but equal" was constitutionally
impermissible, but it did not. Instead, after determining that excluding women from VMI
violated the principles of Equal Protection, the Court engaged in a point-by-point comparison of
VWIL and VMI and finally determined that because the two institutions were not comparable,
excluding women from VMI was not permissible.
Had the Court found that VMIL provided opportunities for women comparable to those VMI
provided for men, it may have concluded that the Constitutional requirements for equal
protection had been met. If separation by sex is inherently unconstitutional, as is separation by
race, the Court arguably would not have engaged in its lengthy point-by-point analysis
comparing the two Virginia schools. But the Court did compare the two schools and their
programs, thus opening the door to the possibility that "separate but comparable" in the context
of single-sex schools and classrooms are constitutionally permissible.
K-12 Education
There have been few caSes involving single-sex public elementary and secondary education,
but two federal court decisions serve to illustrate the judicial approach to the issues involved.
These two courts arrived at different results, but the cases involved different sets of pertinent
facts.
The first case was Vorchheimer v. School District a/Philadelphia (1976) and was decided by
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court held that a school district board, in a system
otherwise coeducational, could maintain a limited number of single-sex high schools in which
enrollment was voluntary and the educational opportunities offered to girls and boys were
essentially equal.
The plaintiff in Vorchheimer (1976) was a female student who alleged unconstitutional
discrimination because she was denied admission into an all-male high school. Although she was
eligible to attend Girls High, an all-girls college preparatory high school, the student decided she
wanted to attend the all-male counterpart, Central High School. Both schools offered an equally
stringent education, with comparable academic facilities, similar alumni achievements and
historical connections, and similar rates of graduate placements into prestigious universities. The
plaintiff presented no factual reasons for her desire to attend Central High School rather than
Girls High, and she admitted that after her visit she simply did not like the impression that the
all-girls school gave her. After trial, the district court found the gender-based classification at the
two schools to lack a fair and substantial relationship to the board's legitimate interest and
enjoined the practice. The defendant school district appealed.
The court of appeals summarized the parties' positions:
1. the school district had chosen to make available on a voluntary basis the time-honored
alternative of single-sex high schools;
2. the schools for boys and girls were comparable in quality, academic standing, and
prestige;
3. the plaintiff preferred to go to the boys' school because of its academic reputation and her
personal reaction to Central High School. She submitted no factual evidence that
attendance at Girls High would constitute psychological or other injury;

4. the deprivation asserted is that of the opportunity to attend a specific school, not the
deprivation of an opportunity to obtain an education at a school with comparable
academic facilities, faculty, and prestige.
The court of appeals looked first to federal statutory law to determine if the issues could be
resolved on that basis. The court found that Title IX excluded from its coverage the admission
policies of secondary schools. The court also considered the implications of the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, but found that legislation to be equivocal. Concluding
that no federal statutes authoritatively addressed the problem, the court turned to the
constitutional issue that had prompted the federal court to order that qualified female students be
admitted to the all-male high school.
In addressing the Equal Protection Clause issue, the court of appeals noted that in each of the
Supreme Court cases reviewed by the district court there was an actual deprivation of a benefit to
a female that could not be obtained elsewhere; in none of these cases was there a situation in
which equal opportunity was extended to each sex or in which the restriction applied to both.
And, none had occurred in an educational setting.
The Vorchheimer (1977) court stated its view about the pertinent educational issue involved
in the case:
Equal educational opportunities should be available to both sexes in any intellectual field.
However, the special emotional problems of the adolescent years are matters of human
experience and have led some educational experts to opt for one-sex high schools. While this
policy has limited acceptance on its merits, it does have its basis in a theory of equal benefit
and not discriminatory denial. (Id. at 887).
The court noted that the Supreme Court had ruled on one gender-based school admissions
policy by affirming a district court decision that a state system including both co-educational and
single-sex campuses for both men and women was permissible. Because this case was a
summary affirmance of a three-judge district court, the court of appeals did not have the benefit
of the Supreme Court's reasoning, but still gave the result precedential weight (Vorchheimer at
887).
The court of appeals summarized its reasoning:
The record does contain sufficient evidence to establish that a legitimate educational policy
may be served by utilizing single-sex high schools. The primary aim of any school system
must be to furnish an education of as high a quality as is feasible. Measures which would
allow innovation in methods and techniques to achieve that goal have a high degree of
relevance. Thus, given the objective of a quality education and a controverted, but respected
theory that adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of the
school board here does bear a substantial relationship. (Id. at 887-88).
The court of appeals stated that it was not necessary to decide whether Vorchheimer required
application of the rational basis test or the more demanding substantial relationship test, because
under either test the result would have been the same. The court reversed and remanded,
concluding that the board regulations establishing single-sex high schools did not offend the
Equal Protection Clause.
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The second case was Garrett v. Board of Education of School District ofDetroit (1991),
which was decided by a federal district court. The plaintiffs were girls and their parents seeking
an injunction prohibiting the opening of all-male "Academies" established by the defendant
Detroit Board of Education, alleging that the board's action violated both their statutory and
constitutional rights.
After struggling for many years with high rates of unemployment, school dropouts, and
homicides among urban males, the board of education planned to open the Academies as a
means of addressing some of these issues with different methods than those being used in the
existing high schools. Male students in the Academies would study not only the traditional
curriculum offered in coeducational high schools, but would also experience programs on career
development, test-taking skills, and civic and social responsibilities. Students would also
participate in a "Rites of Passage" curriculum intended to focus on male growth and esteem
issues. The male students at these schools would benefit from extended school days, tutoring
sessions, summer classes, and personal attention from mentors. Parents had to sign a "covenant
of participation" promising to stay involved in their children's education, and teachers received
additional training beyond that normally offered within the school system.
The plaintiffs in Garrett (1991) prevailed on their allegations of violations of both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title IX. Relying on Hogan (1982), the district court required the Board of
Education to show that the sex-based classification serves "important governmental objectives
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives" (Garrett at 1006). The Board's reliance on excluding girls because the Academy's
were intended for "at-risk" students simply did not make sense. Categorically defining "at-risk"
students as males did not acknowledge that similar at-risk situations existed for the female
population. There was no evidence that the educational system was failing urban males because
females attend schools with males. In fact, the educational system was also failing females. Thus,
the district court concluded that the application ofthe second prong ofthe Hogan (1982) test to
the facts at hand made it likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on the constitutional claim.
The Board attempted to defend against the Title IX (2001) complaint by arguing that Title IX
excludes from its coverage the admission plans in kindergarten through grade twelve and that its
legislative history recognized the need for continued experimentation with unique methods of
education, such as the Academies. The court disagreed with the Board's legislative
interpretations, stating that the admission plans covered under the exclusion were for historically
preexisting single sex schools, not newly created ones, such as the Academies. Also, the U.S.
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) had offered an opinion that seemed to
suggest that all-male public elementary and secondary schools would violate Title IX (2001). In
this instance, the court took the OCR opinion to heart and concluded that Title IX prohibited the
Academies.
The Title IX analysis in Garrett (1991) seems to be at odds with the language of the statute,
(see, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(1)), the implementing regulations, (see, 34 C.F.R. 106.35(b), 2000), and
the statement in the OCR guidelines (see, 67 Fed. Reg. 31102, May 8, 2002), that single-sex
schools are permissible, if there is a comparable opportunity for the excluded sex. The district
court noted that the school district had hinted that an academy for girls was in the works, but the
court found that any later attempt to equalize opportunities for girls would not compensate for
their lost opportunities to learn in the special environment of the academies.
The district court also addressed an allegation that the academies were prohibited by the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. Because the only applicable case was easily

distinguished, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated probability of success on
that claim.
The Garrett (1991) court also found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that
Michigan state law did not permit the creation of the academies. The impact of state law on the
creation of single-sex schools and classrooms could be an important issue where state statutes are
more prohibitive of any form of sex discrimination than is federal law.

The Concept of Single-Sex Education
Much of the impetus for single-sex schooling has originated from some general concerns that
girls do not fare as well in coeducational settings as do their male peers. There have also been
claims, however, that boys may do better in a single-sex setting.

Perceived Problem
Released in 1992, a report commissioned by the American Association of University Women
Educational Foundation (AAUW), How Schools Shortchange Girls, presented a compilation of
research showing that girls were receiving a much different education than boys in coeducational
public schools. The authors found that girls received less attention than boys, girls received less
constructive teacher feedback than boys, girls had fewer complex personal interactions with
instructors, boys received more wait time for responses than girls, and gender bias was prevalent
in subjects such as math and science. The AAUW authors suggested that current educational
practices be reviewed in order to best meet the needs of both boys and girls and offered a set of
recommendations to address what was seen as an inequitable situation.
A 1999 follow-up report, Gender Gaps: Where Schools Still Fail Our Children, again
commissioned by the AAUW Educational Foundation, concluded that although improvements
had been made in attempts to make education more equitable, coeducational public schools were
still not best meeting the needs of both boys and girls. The number of girls taking math, science,
and technology courses had increased, closing the gap between male and female enrollees.
However, girls still outperformed boys on verbal measures in their early years, girls were still
more adversely affected by dropping out of school, and sex roles and stereotypes were still
promoted within the classroom.
Single-sex schools for girls have been proposed as a possible remedy. Sadker & Sadker
(1994) reported that girls in single-sex schools enjoyed greater academic opportunities, including
an increased sense of freedom, the encouragement of young women's voices, and a fostering of
more confident and independent young women. Girls in single-sex schools also exhibited higher
self-esteem, enrolled in more math and science courses, and pursued male-dominated career
fields. "They are intellectually curious, serious about their studies, and achieve more" (p. 233).
Anecdotal research may shed insight into the personal nature and responses to single-sex
education. Carstensen's (1999) qualitative research examined the experiences of both teachers
and students in two private schools for girls in Honolulu. She reported through their own words
the lack of fear and the ability to find a stronger, more independent voice, one that is often lost to
the more aggressive nature of the boys in the classroom. She found a "female energy" that
created an environment of excitement and exuberance and a sense of a cohesive community.
Some teachers and students compared it to compassion and a sense of caring, describing the
overwhelming feeling of freedom and the ability to express one's true self without having to
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worry about the confines of society. One participant noted, "For me, I think that the female
energy we see is the school offering the opportunity for the girls to find who they are and to find
their own voice ... You can be yourself. You don't have to be that image you put on when you go
to school" (Carstensen, 1999, p. 98).
But boys have their own set of problems in school. Sadker & Sadker (1994) found that boys
received lower report card grades than girls, were nine times more likely to suffer higher
academic stress levels, were more likely to be recommended to special education programs, and
were more likely to be punished for misbehavior.
As noted in Gender Gaps (AAUW, 1999), boys were less likely than girls to enroll in fine
arts, foreign languages, advanced English electives, and other humanities courses and when they
did, they tended to underperform girls. Additionally, fewer boys than girls were involved in
gifted programs.

Proposed Solution
Given the differences many studies have found between the educational needs of boys and
girls, separation of the sexes would seem to be a logical solution. Caplice (1994) summarized
some of the education policy arguments by identifying three primary state interests furthered by
single-sex education: excellence in education, a self-confident citizenry with well-developed
leadership skills, and system-wide diversity in education.
Gurian, Henley, and Trueman (2002), whose studies include research into how the brain
functions, explained how boys and girls learn differently and what schools might do to create the
ultimate classroom for both boys and girls. They proposed that, especially at the middle school
level, separate-sex education offers one of a number of possibilities for educational
improvement. This approach would not harm children, as they are already naturally inclined
toward separating by sex and could potentially help children who are not learning as well as they
might in the naturally gender-competitive environment of coeducation. Also, there are examples
from schools where students are separated by sex in the lunchroom or during in-school
suspension where educators have noted fewer behavior problems.
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (2001) expressed her belief in the merits of single-sex
education. She stated that "[s]tudy after study has demonstrated that girls and boys in single-sex
schools are academically more successful and ambitious than their co-educational counterparts"
(p. 1076).
Hutchison (2001) also cited a newspaper column in which the columnist had noted that while
the benefits of single-sex education for boys have been less well-documented, there is at least
anecdotal evidence that boys' schools in the inner cities, where discipline is stressed and positive
male role models emphasized, may result in lower dropout rates and higher test scores.
Proponents of single-sex education have their own organization and website, the National
Organization for Single-Sex Public Education, at <www.singlesexschools.org>. The view of this
organization is that both boys and girls have special educational needs that may be best met in a
single-sex educational environment.

Opposition
The enthusiasm for single-sex public school education has not been shared by all. The
challenges to single-sex public education come from many sources: women's groups,

educational organizations, parents, students, and lawyers. Stabiner (2002) noted the struggles of
the New York Public School System to open the Young Women's Leadership School, which was
committed to offering a demanding single-sex curriculum. But complaints came from the New
York Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Rights Coalition, and the National Organization
of Women, contending that any admission that girls may need to be educated in a different
manner than boys would be detrimental to the women's rights movement and would hinder the
cause of gender equality. The school did open as planned the fall of 1996.
Some opposition to single-sex education and to the proposed changes in the Title IX
regulations come from unlikely sources. The National Coalition for Women and Girls in
Education (2002) responded to the Secretary of Education's Notice oflntent to Regulate with a
letter of opposition, citing a lack of clarity as to the rationale for the proposed changes. The
Coalition argued that the research on single-sex education is "inconclusive, largely anecdotal,
and based on private and parochial schools, not public schools." Additionally, it incorporated the
findings in the AAUW 1998 report, Separated by Sex, which reported that single-sex education
works for some students, but not for all, and that the long-term effects of single-sex education are
simply unknown. The Coalition also stated that it "does not believe that Title IX should be
altered in the name of developing an education program that mayor may not be beneficial to
students' ability to learn in public education" (National Coalition for Women and Girls in
Education, 2002).
A result of roundtable discussion, Separated by Sex produced a mixed response about the
merits of single-sex education. Researchers who had studied the issues came to a consensus on
six points: (a) There is no conclusive evidence that single-sex education is better than
coeducation; (b) Policymakers and educators need to continue working to define the parts of a
"good education;" (c) Single-sex education does produce positive results for some students in
some settings; (d) Long-term impact of single-sex education is unknown; (e) No education
environment is a complete escape from sexism; and (f) Investigating single-sex programs
requires consideration of outside factors that makes each single-sex situation unique, from the
type of program, type of school, to type of students enrolled.
Thus, even the AAUW, an organization that early on promoted single-sex education, seemed
to step back from its original stance and acknowledge that all students can benefit from
education reform. The issue of improving education was not limited to helping only girls or only
boys, but focused on an overall education reform that could benefit all students in all schools,
whether coeducational or single-sex.
Caplice (1994) pointed out that the well-informed advocate of single-sex schooling should
also consider common criticisms of this form of education such as:
1. While single-sex education may be an admirable and viable educational alternative to
coeducation, the state should not pay for the option because it involves state-supported
gender separation.
2. Single-sex schooling does not prepare students for a coeducational world.
3. If the market does not provide for this form of education, apparently there is no demand
for it.
4. While single-sex education may be beneficial, it is only beneficial for women, not men.
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Comparable or Equal
There is an important distinction between "comparable" and "equa1." Meg Moulton, Director
of the National Coalition of Girls Schools, in a "thoughtful letter" (cited in Hutchison, 2001),
explained the distinction. Regarding Hutchison's effort to allow federal funds to be used for
"comparable" single-sex programs for both boys and girls, Moulton wrote:
While the distinction [between "comparable" and "equal"] may be subtle, we feel the
implications are profound, to the degree that the intent of this section of the bill would be
virtually nullified if [equal] is adopted ... at the very heart of the impetus to create single-sex
schooling opportunities is the well-established fact that boys and girls often exhibit unique
learning styles ... To state that these settings must be equal in all respects is, simply put,
illogica1. (Hutchison, 2001, p. 1080)
Given the language in the Title IX regulations, (see, 34 C.F.R. 106.35(b), 2002), and the
Court's apparent search in u.s. v. Virginia (1996) for "comparability" in the programs offered by
VWIL and VMI, the distinction between "comparable" and "equal" is indeed important. If all
aspects of separate schools or classes for boys and girls are the same, the educational logic for
the separation would rest only on the simple fact of keeping the sexes apart. The research
suggests that there are meaningful differences between boys and girls that should be addressed
by corresponding differences in the education that is provided.

The No Child Left Behind Act, Title IX,
and the Equal Protection Clause: Uncharted Waters
The No Child Left Behind Act of2001 has opened the door for "innovative programs,"
including single-sex schools and classrooms. Those who see such an arrangement as a promising
educational option will now have the additional incentive of federal funding. As noted in the Act,
however, such schools must be consistent with applicable law.
Neither Title IX nor current federal regulations and guidelines categorically prohibit singlesex schools and classrooms. Given the support of the Department of Education for the No Child
Left Behind Act, If and when new Title IX regulations are promulgated, they are likely to clarify
how single-sex schools and classrooms may be organized and operated so as to be consistent
with the requirements of federal law.
The Constitution does not prohibit all classifications based on gender. But single-sex schools
and classrooms would be subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, and states and
school districts may be called upon to justify keeping boys and girls apart. The state would be
required to show that such a sex-based classification serves an important governmental purpose
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. Defendants could cite the research showing that single-sex schools and classrooms
provide benefits for both boys and girls; plaintiffs could argue, however, that the research is
inconclusive.
Those who would establish single-sex schools or classrooms may be confronted with legal
challenges and should be prepared to testify about the educational rationale for such an
arrangement. As in many areas of education law, courts generally look with favor upon
educational policies and practices that are grounded in educational research and professional

judgement. If school officials can demonstrate that both boys and girls have comparable
educational opportunities, then such single-sex educational settings should not run afoul of
federal law.
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